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The Single Monetary Policy 




The statutes of the European Central Bank (ECB) stipulate that it should have recourse to national 
central banks (NCBs) to carry out monetary policy operations. Such a structure would not be a 
problem if these operations were all identical across member states and if the resulting profits and 
losses were shared. But this is not the case today. In this sense, the euro area no longer has a ‘single’ 
monetary policy.  
There is little one can do about this situation, except to wait until the government purchase 
programme ends and is then reversed.   
However, two steps could be undertaken already now: i) the granting of emergency liquidity 
assistance should be shifted to the ECB, and ii) the NCBs should be forbidden to undertake any 
financial operation that is not a direct consequence of their execution of the ECB’s monetary policy 
decisions. The existing stocks of assets (and liabilities), the so-called ANFA (Agreement on Net 
Financial Assets) holdings, which are not related to monetary policy, should be transferred to either 
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Executive Summary 
Formally speaking, the single monetary policy is not ‘implemented’ in a decentralised way, but 
is only ‘executed’ operationally by national central banks (NCBs). The statutes of the European 
Central Bank (ECB) assign the formulation of the policy to the Governing Council and the 
implementation to the Executive Board of the ECB. The role of NCBs is limited to carrying out 
operations, but only to the extent possible and appropriate. 
The statutes are thus clear: the NCBs should act simply as the agents of the ECB and refrain 
from exercising any discretion in ‘carrying out operations’, with all profits and losses equally 
shared.   
This is the way the Eurosystem worked until the crisis erupted. Given that the main policy 
instruments involved operations with banks (as opposed to open market operations), it seemed 
natural that essentially all operations were carried out by the NCBs.  
With the euro crisis, financial markets fractured along national lines and tensions arose among 
NCBs about the eligibility criteria of collateral for refinancing purposes. In 2011 it was decided 
that NCBs could, under certain conditions, accept collateral of lower quality, but that these 
transactions would be taken at their own risk. Although that exemption from the general ECB 
rules was only temporary and no losses were recorded, it represents the first time NCBs 
acquired a considerable margin of discretion in their execution of the common policy. 
The real ‘decentralisation’ came with the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) under 
which 80% of the purchases are implemented by the NCBs, which are supposed to buy only 
their own government’s bonds. The NCBs are only assigned the amount of bonds to buy. The 
maturity spectrum and all other aspects are left to their discretion. Moreover, there is no loss 
(or profit) sharing for these operations. Over time the assets bought under the PSPP have come 
to dominate the balance sheet of the Eurosystem, which no longer can be regarded as unified. 
This means that there is no longer a ‘single’ monetary policy. 
There is little one can do about this situation, but to wait until the government purchase 
programme ends and is then reversed.   
Nevertheless, two steps could be undertaken already now. 
The granting of Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) should be shifted to the ECB. 
NCBs should be forbidden to undertake any financial operation that is not a direct consequence 
of their execution of the ECB’s monetary policy decisions. The existing stocks of assets (and 
liabilities), the so-called ANFA (Agreement on Net Financial Assets) holdings, which are not 
related to monetary policy, should be transferred to either national finance ministries or 
national special purpose vehicles (SPVs). 
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The Single Monetary Policy and Its Decentralised 
Implementation: An assessment 
Daniel Gros 
CEPS Policy Insights No. 2017-35/September 2017 
1. Introduction 
Since the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), one principle specific to the 
Eurosystem is the centralisation of monetary policy decisions and the decentralisation of the 
actual implementation of monetary policy operations. With the eruption of the crisis and 
introduction of non-standard monetary policy instruments, the Eurosystem’s operational 
framework has undergone large changes. The sharing of responsibilities between the European 
Central Bank (ECB) and the national central banks (NCBs) has become more complex and the 
NCBs seem to have increased their discretion. In that context, the decentralised model might 
contradict the preservation of simplicity and that of ‘single monetary policy’.  
The next section recalls the legal framework of the monetary policy setting under EMU and 
compares it to the US Federal Reserve system. Section 3 looks into the specific role of the ECB, 
as central entity, and the role of NCBs and how these have evolved after the crisis. This section 
also looks into the operational costs and how they differ across countries. Section 4 draws 
conclusions. 
2. The legal framework of a decentralised structure 
The statutes of the ECB, which are incorporated as Annex in the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU) do not mandate a decentralisation of the implementation of the 
euro area’s monetary policy.   
Article 12 
Responsibilities of the decision-making bodies 
12.1. The Governing Council shall adopt the guidelines and take the decisions 
necessary to ensure the performance of the tasks entrusted to the ESCB under this 
Treaty and this Statute. The Governing Council shall formulate the monetary policy 
of the Community including, as appropriate, decisions relating to intermediate 
monetary objectives, key interest rates and the supply of reserves in the ESCB, and 
shall establish the necessary guidelines for their implementation. 
The Executive Board shall implement monetary policy 
To the extent deemed possible and appropriate and without prejudice to the 
provisions of this Article, the ECB shall have recourse to the national central banks to 
carry out operations which form part of the tasks of the ESCB. 
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The first paragraph of Art. 12 says that the Governing Council of the ECB shall “formulate the 
monetary policy”. The second paragraph then stipulates: “The Executive Board shall implement 
monetary policy”. This seems to mandate a centralisation of both decision-making and 
implementation. What is meant by decentralised implementation of monetary policy is that the 
Executive Board should translate the broad decisions of the Governing Council into operational 
instructions (the equivalent of ‘Implementing Acts’ at the Community level), which are then 
transmitted to the ECB itself or the NCBs.  
Decentralisation is mandated only in the third paragraph of Art. 12.1, which says that: “To the 
extent deemed possible and appropriate […], the ECB shall have recourse to the national central 
banks to carry out operations”. The overall intent of the Treaty thus seems to be that national 
central banks should be used to ‘carry out operations’, but there is no hint that they should 
have any leeway or margin of discretion in doing this. 
The injunction to let NCBs carry out the operations in the third paragraph of Art. 12.1 is 
understandable given that, at the time the euro was introduced, the modus operandi of 
monetary policy in the euro area was lending to commercial banks against good collateral. For 
many banks, especially the smaller ones, being able to continue to deal with their usual 
counterparts at home was important in reducing transaction costs and the uncertainty over 
how the new regime would work. Language might also have played a role. Moreover, one has 
to keep in mind that during the first three years of the euro national currencies continued to 
exist (at least in the form of cash). 
But the third paragraph of Art. 12.1 does not say that the national central banks should carry 
out all operations. The Treaty definitely does not mandate that monetary policy would be 
implemented only through NCBs. The other institution that can carry out monetary policy 
operations is the ECB, which has its own distinct legal personality and can undertake all financial 
operations, just like any national central bank.  
The ECB played, admittedly, a minor role at the beginning, mostly related to exchange rate 
operations. As part of the foreign exchange reserves of Member States were pooled in the ECB, 
foreign exchange market interventions were centralised. 
2.1. The example of the United States 
A parallel with the US Federal Reserve system and its decentralised structure is instructive. US 
monetary policy is implemented today by only one of the constituent regional Reserve Banks, 
the New York Fed. But this was not the intention at the start.  
For a long time, banking was considered a prerogative of the states, which explains why the 
Federal Reserve was founded only in 1913, 130 years after the founding of the US. The 
resistance to federal action in this area was overcome only because the absence of a national 
central bank and national policymaking was finally perceived as being one of the root causes of 
the higher frequency of financial crisis in the US.   
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The act that created the Federal Reserve System in 1913, foresaw the formation of 12 districts 
(formally 8-12), which were supposed to represent different regional economic and banking 
interests. Each of the 12 Reserve Banks was intended to operate independently from the other 
Reserve Banks. The Federal Reserve thus did not grow out of an agglomeration of ‘state’ banks, 
which had existed in the 19th century. Instead, the districts were created when the Fed came 
into existence. As the nation's economy became more integrated, the effective conduct of 
monetary policy began to require increased collaboration and coordination throughout the 
System. This led to the revisions to the Federal Reserve Act in 1933 and 1935 that created the 
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). 
Individual regional Reserve Bank Districts encompass the territory of several states and the 
borders between the districts do not always run along state lines. Rather districts’ boundaries 
are based on economic considerations. A conscious attempt had been made to avoid a 
confluence of state-specific political (and business) interests and the components of the 
Federal Reserve System. This was done despite the fact that, at the time, banking supervision 
and deposit insurance (where it existed at all) were still the organised along state lines. The 
individual Federal Reserve District banks thus represented regional business interests (agrarian, 
versus industrial, for example) rather than formal regional political structures. This was natural 
at a time when government’s influence on banking in general was minimal. The link between 
state chartered banks and the state level development banks which had existed in the 1830s 
and 1840s had been abolished under the national banking act passed in the midst of the Civil 
War (1863), a time when the sovereignty of the was being denied by the (ultimately) victorious 
North. 
The Federal Reserve also relied (and still does so to some extent) on the implementation of its 
policy by the District Banks, which initially were even able to set different discount rates.  From 
the beginning the New York Fed had a special position as the only District bank with important 
foreign links. Today it remains the only one conducting foreign exchange operations.   
Over time, the entire execution of Federal Reserve policy has been devolved to the ‘Desk’ at 
the New York Federal Reserve, which is thus now the only District involved in the 
implementation of monetary policy in the US. The reason is of course that the financial centre 
has moved to New York. But the entire NY reserve District would have a share of only about 
10% of the Federal Reserve System, if the capital key analogous to the ones of the ECB would 
be applied. One of the reasons why such a system does not create political frictions is that the 
governing structure of the New York Fed (whose district encompasses New York State, the 12 
northern counties of New Jersey, Fairfield County in Connecticut, Puerto Rico and the US Virgin 
Islands) has no link at all with the administration or any other body of the state of New York.1 
                                                 
1 See Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2016). 
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3. Decentralised operational implementation versus decentralisation of profit and 
losses 
3.1 The role of the ECB 
At the beginning of EMU, the ECB did not take an active part in the operational implementation 
of its policy, and its balance sheet was very small: only around €60 billion in 1999-2000, as 
shown in Figure 1 below. The balance sheet of the ECB started to increase when it was assigned 
notionally 8% of the total euro bank notes in circulation. However, this did not mean that the 
ECB was actively involved in carrying out (its own) policy.  
The ECB found itself suddenly involved in an important way in monetary policy operations 
mainly in 2008, when it became the counterpart of the USD liquidity provided via a SWAP line 
from the Federal Reserve. In that context, the dollar liquidity was centrally acquired and simply 
transferred to national central banks, which then offered it to ‘their’ banks. For this reason, as 
shown in Figure 1, in 2008 the balance sheet of the ECB suddenly exhibits two large items: intra-
euro area claims and ‘other liabilities’. However, the need for USD liquidity arose only for a few 
months in 2008, and when trans-Atlantic money markets resumed operations, this role quickly 
come to an end for the ECB. 
It was few years later, in 2010 that the ECB started to undertake operations in a sustained way 
only when the asset buying began, under the Securities Markets Programme (SMP). 
 
Figure 1. Evolution of the ECB's balance sheet, 1999-2016 
 
Data source: ECB. 
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3.2 The role of the national central banks 
During the first decade of EMU, NCBs operated basically as local 'access terminals' for the 
Eurosystem's tender operations. All they could do was to publish the conditions for the tenders 
fixed in Frankfurt and then check the bids coming in from banks.  
Moreover, with risk premia low in general and an integrated money market, different NCBs did 
not face strong incentives to somehow favour their own national financial institutions. 
With the onset of the financial crisis, however, incentives changed. Different NCBs had very 
different views (and incentives) regarding the criteria of eligibility of assets or prudential 
haircuts on lowly-rated national debt used as collateral for monetary policy operations.  
The policy remained unified, but the rapid deterioration of ratings forced the ECB to lower its 
threshold for eligibility of collateral several times; it later changed to a sliding scale of gradually 
increasing haircuts, depending on the ratings. All these decisions were highly controversial 
internally, but the policy remained unified.2 
When in 2010 financial markets became increasingly unsettled by the prospect of Greece losing 
market access (and governments hesitated to create a ‘bail-out’ mechanism), the Governing 
Council decided that a direct intervention in the market was necessary. Buying bonds of some 
governments in financial difficulties (and one close to default), as under the Securities Market 
Programme (SMP), was of course also controversial. But the SMP, which involved the ECB in 
operations, was executed by all NCBs and under full risk (and profit) sharing.   
The relatively small, covered bond-buying programmes, which started around the same time, 
also maintained the full loss-sharing, but they constituted a first, small departure from a unified 
policy, since the importance of covered bonds varied significantly across member countries. 
The first real departure from full loss-sharing and equal rules came in 2011, when market 
segmentation increased and the ECB felt compelled to change its policy instruments: “The NCBs 
are allowed, as a temporary solution, to accept as collateral for Eurosystem credit operations 
additional performing credit claims that satisfy specific eligibility criteria. The responsibility 
entailed in the acceptance of such credit claims will be borne by the NCB authorising their use.”3 
                                                 
2 The first leg of the crisis also brought the first (and I believe only) test of the risk-sharing mechanism when the 
Eurosystem made losses on lending to euro area subsidiaries of the main Icelandic banks. These losses arose 
because the banks suddenly became insolvent and the collateral had been basically claims drawn on each other 
(so-called ‘love letters’, which became worthless when all three of them became insolvent within a very short 
period of time. The ECB operations with Irish banks had been booked mainly through Luxembourg and the 
Bundesbank given that the subsidiaries in question had been located there. The ECB has never published a full 
account of this episode. 
3 See https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2011/html/pr111208_1.en.html  
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3.3 The end of the single monetary policy?  
Two kinds of operations carried out by NCBs in the eurozone acquired large importance after 
the crisis and marked a substantial change in the meaning of decentralised implementation of 
monetary policy: the emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) and the purchases under the Public 
Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP).   
Concerning the ELA, Art. 14 of the Statutes of the ESCB states:  
14.3. The national central banks are an integral part of the ESCB and shall act in 
accordance with the guidelines and instructions of the ECB. The Governing Council 
shall take the necessary steps to ensure compliance with the guidelines and 
instructions of the ECB, and shall require that any necessary information be given 
to it. 
14.4. National central banks may perform functions other than those specified in 
this Statute unless the Governing Council finds, by a majority of two thirds of the 
votes cast, that these interfere with the objectives and tasks of the ESCB. Such 
functions shall be performed on the responsibility and liability of national central 
banks and shall not be regarded as being part of the functions of the ESCB. 
It is difficult to say whether ELA operations are part of the 'single' monetary policy. In principle 
they should not be considered part of monetary policy as their purpose is to provide 
‘emergency liquidity assistance’ to banks that are solvent, but experience temporary liquidity 
problems. It is provided by the national central banks under their own discretion, subject to a 
veto by the Governing Council, needing a two-thirds majority, and at their own risk.  
The massive continuous recourse to ELA, by a small number of NCBs (including at first the 
Bundesbank with very large amounts, but only temporarily) created de facto different policies, 
or at least very different situations, in different countries. In Greece, ELA has amounted to over 
30% of GDP and has persisted for years now. It is difficult to consider it as an emergency 
measure to address a liquidity problem. 
The most important breach in the principle that NCBs should only be carrying out operations 
without any margin of discretion came with the PSPP. Under this programme, 80% of the total 
purchases are carried out by NCBs and they buy only marketable debt instruments issued by 
their central government. NCBs are given only the euro amount they should spend per 
month. The type of bonds, including the duration or maturity, is left to their discretion. This is 
an important margin of discretion, which impacts the effectiveness of quantitative easing (QE). 
Indeed, prevalent economic theory suggests that the effectiveness of QE depends on the 
amount or the duration that the central bank takes off the market. Purchases of very long-term 
debt securities will have a larger impact on the maturity structure of the remaining debt on the 
market than purchases of shorter maturities.  
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Moreover, such structure implies that there is no loss (and one assumes profit) sharing for 
these purchases of national bonds. As a consequence, the balance sheet of the Eurosystem is 
no longer unified. 
Over time, the PSPP has come to dominate the balance sheet of the Eurosystem. At present 
about one-half of the balance sheet of the Eurosystem (which is about €3,660 billion) is the 
result of operations that the individual central banks (see Table 1) have executed with a wide 
margin of discretion and for which the profits and losses will accrue only to them. 
Table 1. Breakdown of debt securities under the PSPP (€ billion) 
as of 
31 August 2017 
Monthly net 
purchases* 
Cumulative monthly net 
purchases* 
Austria 1,223 46,310 
Belgium 1,544 58,299 
Cyprus 0 215 
Germany 9,803 413,868 
Estonia 0 65 
Spain 5,086 206,189 
Finland 528 26,661 
France 9,270 334,568 
Ireland 488 22,873 
Italy 7,657 291,366 
Lithuania 4 2,683 
Luxembourg 47 2,188 
Latvia 25 1,633 
Malta 27 994 
Netherlands 2,174 92,680 
Portugal 414 29,076 
Slovenia 141 6,094 
Slovakia 60 10,045 
Supranationals 4,347 187,531 
Total 42,839 1,733,338 
Data source: ECB. 
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There is another set of operations performed by NCBs that represent an issue for the principle 
of the unified monetary policy, and they are essentially a legacy of the pre-EMU setting. NCBs 
were allowed to carry over from the pre-EMU times the holdings of assets they had. Operations 
linked to such assets, the so-called ANFA holdings, have a peculiar nature and are difficult to be 
analysed through the balance sheet of the Eurosystem. This greatly reduces the transparency 
of the balance sheet. A ‘clean’ balance sheet is a key feature for a central bank, as the liabilities 
of a central bank are regarded as ‘high-powered money’.  
3.4 Operational considerations  
One of the practical considerations behind the operational decentralisation of the 
implementation of monetary policy was that national central banks had the staff necessary to 
carry out the tenders and repos through which the euro area’s monetary policy was 
implemented.   
Table 2 below shows the staff numbers of the major NCBs in the Eurosystem and two other 
major world central banks. The first column of number shows that at the start of EMU, the ECB 
had only 700 staff, twenty times fewer than either the Bundesbank or the Banque de France. 
The five largest Eurosystem NCBs had a total staff of over 40,000, roughly double that of the 
Federal Reserve. Over the next decade, the headcount of the ECB doubled to almost 1,600, 
whereas that of the NCBs fell by about one-quarter. However, the ECB remained tiny compared 
to any individual national central bank of the larger Member States. By last year the staff of the 
ECB had doubled again, but this is due mostly to the needs of the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism. The ECB would probably still not be able to carry out the monetary policy of the 
euro area on its own. 
Table 2. Number of employees at selected national central banks 
      1999 2009 2016 
DE Deutsche Bundesbank  15,240 10,575 11,222 
ES Banco de España  3,148 2,727 2,990 
FR Banque de France  15,581 12,746 11,690 
IT Banca d’Italia  8,802 7,639 6,921 
NL De Nederlandsche Bank  1,632 1,513 1,703 
Sum  of major eurosystem NCBs  42,700  33,700 32,800 
EU European Central Bank  732 1,563 3,171 
UK Bank of England  2,810 1,816 3,983 
US Federal Reserve Banks   23,288 17,398 19,023 
Notes: Different institutions provide different measures of their personnel: headcount, full time equivalent and some are 
average for the year whereas others refer to year end. 
Source: Own compilation based on central banks’ annual reports.  
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It is difficult to determine whether the carrying out the monetary policy operations in a 
decentralised manner is operationally efficient. Total employment in the Eurosystem and the 
associated costs are still much higher than for the Federal Reserve. As an aside we note that 
the staff costs differ widely across NCBs. 
Table 3 below shows the cost per headcount at different major national central banks within 
the euro area. It is apparent that even across countries with similar income per capita, the 
average employee can cost twice as much as in others. When comparing the average wage of 
central banks’ staff to the average compensation of employees in the country, the ratio is quite 
different across countries. 
Table 3. Staff costs at selected central banks (thousands of euro)  
  1999 2009  2016  
 Average annual cost per person  
CB average wage relative to national average wage 
(2016) 
Buba 56.6 80.9 100.1 1.17 
BdE 54.1 84.7 80.7 1.68 
BdF 82.0 108.8 121.6 1.26 
BdI 103.8 171.5 202.7 2.25 
DNB 54.5 87.8 119.8 1.45 
Data sources: National central banks and Ameco. 
4. Conclusions 
A certain degree of 'disintegration' of the single monetary policy was unavoidable when the 
Eurosystem encountered a systemic crisis due to the fracturing of the financial markets along 
national lines – a crisis for which the system was not prepared. 
With the (partial) Banking Union and the gradual disappearance of risk premia, one should 
return as quickly as possible to the single monetary policy, i.e. all operations subject to full loss 
(and profit) sharing. But this has de facto been rendered impossible by the huge amounts of 
national government bonds that now sit on the balance sheets of the NCBs. 
What could be done is to at least clarify the role of the national central banks in the Eurosystem: 
their role is to carry out the common monetary policy. They should stop undertaking any other 
financial operations. This means that all the ‘dead wood’ (Bini Smaghi and Gros, 2000) on the 
balance sheets of the national central banks, carried over from the pre-EMU times, should be 
transferred to other institutions, perhaps national wealth funds. The choice of how this is done 
could be left to the Member States, but they, or rather the NCBs should be given a clear 
deadline by which time all assets and liabilities that do not relate to the execution of the 
common monetary policy would disappear from their balance sheets. In principle, this could be 
achieved under Art. 14 of the statutes of the ECB by a decision of the ECB itself. But it is unlikely 
that the NCBs will themselves be willing to give up these other tasks, which provide them with 
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substantial revenue and activities. A change may be required to amend Art. 14 to clarify that 
NCBs could only in exceptional circumstances and only temporarily undertake financial 
operations that are not directly part of their execution of the common monetary policy. 
A second conclusion is that responsibility for ELA should be shifted to the ECB (as the central 
legal entity of the Eurosystem). With the SSM now in charge of supervision, the ECB should 
have all the required information needed to judge whether a bank is insolvent or not and thus 
merits liquidity assistance. 
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